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A revival of the tradition of utopian thinking seems to me one of the
important intellectual tasks of today. Since we live in a time of dis-
enchantment, such thinking, where it is rational in aim and method
and not mere escapism, is not easy; it is easier to concentrate on pro-
grams for choosing among lesser evils, even to the point where these
evils can scarcely be distinguished, one from the other. For there is al-
ways a market for lesser-evil thinking which poses immediate alterna-
tives; the need for thinking which confronts us with great hopes and
great plans is not so evident. Yet without great plans, it is hard, and
often self-defeating, to make little ones. Such utopian thinking re-
quires what I have termed "the nerve of failure", that is, theability
to face the possibility of defeat without feeling morally crushed.? With-
out this sort of courage, any failure implies a personal defect, and brings
feelings of intolerable isolation; to avoid this fate, people tend to repress
their claims for a decent world to a "practical" point, and to avoid any
goals, personal or social, that seem out of step with common sense.
Curiously enough, however, in a dynamic political context, it is the
modest, common-sensical goals which are often unattainabk-therefore
"utopian" in the derogatory sense. I do not mean, of course, that "any-
thing can happen"; I do mean that the self-styled realist tends to un-
derestimate the strength of latent forces because he is too impressed
by what he "sees". To take only one example, it often seems that the
retention of a given status quo is a modest hope; many lawyers, political
scientists and economists occupy themselves by suggesting the minimal
changes which are necessary to stand still; yet today this hope is almost
invariably disappointed; the status quo proves the most illusory of
goals. To aim at this goal requires little nerve, for many people share
the same hope; so long as things appear to go well, anxiety is stilled;
and even when things go badly, many people will join in providing ra-
tionalizations for the failure: misery will have company.
The problem of how individuals can fortify themselves, without in-
sanity, to the point at which they will believe their own, isolated imag-
inations, is of course a very old one. It is this problem that Spinoza
deals with when he discusses how the Biblical prophets attempted to
assure themselves of certainty:
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"For instance, Jeremiah's prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem
was confirmed by the prophecies of other prophets, and by the
threats in the law, and therefore it needed no sign; whereas Han-
aniah, who, contrary to all the prophets, foretold the speedy re-
storation of the state, stood in need of a sign, or he would have been
in doubt as to the truth of his prophecy, until it was confirmed by
facts. 'The prophet which prophesieth of peace, when the word
of the prophet shall come to pass, then shall the prophet be known
that the Lord hath truly sent him.' "2
Today in America, at least in intellectual circles, the Jeremiahs
share a widespread, and in that sense comforting, defeatism; there
are few Hananiahs who prophesy restoration and peace. The recent
book Communitas: Means of Livelihood and Ways of Life,' by Percival
and Paul Goodman, is therefore particularly welcome; it is avowedly
utopian, both in its critique of earlier community plans and in its pres-
entation of new ones. I propose in this article to indicate some of the
Goodmans' contributions to utopian thinking; but first to place these
in perspective by a review, necessarily sketchy, of the present state of
such thinking in America.
I
A hundred years ago, in the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels
welcomed the criticisms which their so-called "utopian" predecessors,
such as St. Simon, Fouridr, and Owen, had made of capitalist society,
but they rejected the peaceable methods of these men for achieving
socialism. Their label "utopian" (expanded in Engels' Socialism: Uto-
pian and Scientific) stuck as a derogatory term. Moreover, having
taken their polemical position, they were themselves bound by it, and
carefully avoided setting forth more than fragmentary views on what
the classless society might look like; this refusal became a mark of
realism and orthodoxy-and a great convenience to left-wing politi-
cians and writers. While some Europeans, such as William Morris and
Theodor Hertzka, 4 continued to work in the older Utopian tradition as
late as the '90's, the masses were soon recruited either for Marxist
"scientific", i.e. hard-headed socialism, or for Fabian and Social-Dem-
ocratic versions of practical, unmessianic politics.
In the rough and ready America of the last century, a serious inter-
est in utopian thought found other obstacles than Marxism. However,
the country itself seemed to be a functioning utopia to peoples else-
where, and it was the scene of most of the utopian experiments of the
2. THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA 51 (Ratner ed. 1927).
* 3. University of Chicago Press (1947). All quotations are from this source
unless otherwise indicated.
4. For discussion and bibliography see LEwis' MumFORD, THE STORY OF UTOPIAS
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period, as in Oneida and New Harmony. Immense enthusiasm greeted
Bellamy's Looking Backward (1888); during the same period, huge au-
diences in the Midwest were inspired by the utopian prophecies of
Ignatius DonnellyA All this ferment has vanished. The appeal of such
writers as Bellamy appears to have declined just about the time that
the socialism of Debs and DeLeon began to make some headway in
America. But since this type of socialism, too, has died out (of course,
economic determinism has always been influential in America, from the
Founding Fathers on down), we must look for deeper causes at work.
The idea of a dialectical opposition between "ideology" and "utopia"
is suggested by Karl Mannheim's book, though I use the words here
in a somewhat different sense from his.6 A "utopia" I define as a ra-
tional belief which is in the long-run interest of the holder; it is a be-
lief, not in an existing reality, but in a potential reality; it must not
violate what we know of nature, including human nature, though it
may extrapolate our present technology and must transcend our present
social organization.7 An "ideology" I define as an irrational system of
belief, not in the interest of the holder. It is sold to him by a group
which has an interest in swindling him; he accepts it because of his own
irrational needs, including his desire to submit to the power of the
vendor group. An ideology may contain elements of truth; these serve
to lend plausibility, rather than to open the eyes and increase the
awareness of the recipient. Contrariwise, a utopia may contain ele-
ments of error, initially less significant than its truth, which assist its
later conversion into an ideology: in this way, the utopias of one age
tend to harden in a distorted form into the ideologies of the next, taken
on faith rather than rationally rediscovered.
The America of the last century, I suggest, made room for a limited
amount of utopian thought and experiment because, among many other
factors, the capitalism of that period was singularly unconcerned about
propagandizing itself as an ideological system. Perhaps this is because
it was so much taken for granted that it did not need verbal defense,
though Southern writers continued to attack its Northern version. The
5. The early chapters of DORFMAN, THORNSxTa VEBIzri Aim ums A.,ucA (1934),
evoke and document this atmosphere.
6. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (translated from the German by Wirth and
Shils) (1936). See also Mannheim, Utopia in 15 ENcyc. Soc. Sc. 200 (1934).
7. These features distinguish utopian thinking from, on the one hand, a mere dream,
and on the other hand, a mere description of exdsting facts. In other words, "utopia" is a
place-in contemporary terms, a plan-that now is nowhere, save maybe for pilot models,
but that may someday be somewhere, so far as science can say; thus, heaven is not a utopia
in my sense, while the Boston of Looking Backward is one. An element of ambiguity re-
mains in these, as in Mannheim's definitions, perhaps reflecting the complexity of the topics
themselves. For a sensitive discussion, see Kenneth Burke, Ideology a,:d Myl, 7 AccaT
195 (Summer, 1947).
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system was qvritten into the landscape, so to speak; it did not need to
be written into books. After the Civil War, a dominant capitalism got
brutal, but it did not get especially articulate; its critics, from Mark
Twain to Veblen, treated it with an impiety and irreverence which we
seldom find today. A few preachers continued to mumble grace over
the economic system, but their combination of theology and economics
was on the wane, while the new one of social Darwinism coupled with
laissez faire seems to have made little impression before William Gra-
ham Sumner started writing such essays as "The Absurd Effort to
Make the World Over." 8 Throughout the period, to be sure, Eastern
capitalists met resistance from the Populists, and perhaps the gold
standard should be called an ideology; but on the whole dissent could
be bought off without too much debate, e.g., by homestead rights, or
by subventions to the appropriate political rings.
By the turn of the century, however, many developments, including
tremors of socialism, put the capitalists on the defensive; they could no
longer quite so freely use Pinkertons; they began to talk, to bargain
collectively "through instruments of their own choosing". Then, a
whole new class of university-trained demi-intellectuals began to find
jobs and status in doing the talking: personnel men, trade-association
men, organization-chart men, lawyers, economists, house-organ men,
advertising men, etc. Meanwhile the school system had taught almost
everyone to read. Thus both the quantity of and the receptivity for
capitalist ideology grew enormously, most of it paid for-as Veblen
pointed out in his article on "The Breadline and the Movies" 9-by the
underlying population, which subscribes to the mass media.
Business enterprise in America has, however, always tended to dis-
guise its ideological pressures under a coating of apparently utopian
aims, such as the promise of a chicken in every pot or a car in every
garage. These promises, when made in U. S. A., can scarcely be called
utopian. First, given our resources, it is not difficult to fulfill them; they
are, in very fact, just around the corner. Second, attainment of these
goals would not make the great mass of well-fed Americans noticeably
happier. The fulfillment of utopian aims, on the other hand, is a revo-
lutionary affair; it makes substantial demands on the community, and
promises substantial gains in human happiness. While in the Age of
Liberalism, capitalism was associated with just such great human aims,
it has become distanced from them in its later phases of complacency,
ideology, or reaction. But the utopian coating referred to has tended
to satisfy masses of people with spurious social goals, while many
thoughtful folk rebelled by doubting the whole Enlightenment con-
cept of gradual progress towards a liberal utopia.
8. 17 FoRuM 92 (1894), reprinted in SuMNER TODAY 99 (Davie ed. 1940).
9. An editorial in THE DIAL, June 14, 1919, reprinted in ESSAYS I OuR CHANGIta
ORm 450 (1934).
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With minor exceptions, moreover, the large-scale anti-business move-
ments in America have tended more and more to copy business methods
in covering an essentially ideological approach with a few utopian
trimmings. Populism, for example, was ambivalent: it included not
only ancient rural hatred for city slicker "usury" but the scarcely veiled
"me too" cry of the farmers, unions, small businessmen and small debt-
ors to be cut in on the big money. The New Deal added to these Popu-
list aims (expressed in the Holding Company Act and other anti-Wall
Street measures) the goal of achieving the Social Democratic attain-
ments of the Continent, such as social insurance, a minimum wage, and
public assistance in housing; none of these measures promised a funda-
mental change in the quality of American life. The T.V.A., some F.S.A.
projects, and a few housing ventures such as Arthurdale and Greenbelt
-these pushed beyond relatively easy attainment towards utopian
goals; the T.V.A. particularly serves as a pilot model for a new way of
life, a new community plan. But the general povertr of aim of the New
Deal is shown by the fact that, by 1937, it had reached its own limits,
a point obscured by its continuing ideological competition with "The
Interests". The war provided a welcome agenda for avoiding insight
into this impasse; the government ideologists sold war bonds (or
"unity") by the same sort of specious arguments as had sold N.R.A.'s
blue eagle.
The more recent political developments which have tended to engen-
der disillusion with all systematic thinking-ideological and utopian
alike-hardly need review. The positive goals of both world wars were
oversold; peace movements have seemed so futile, and have been in
such bad company, as to be discredited among all but the most coura-
geous and independent (or religiously-supported thinkers). Marxian
Socialism, once a branch of bourgeois Enlightenment utopianism de-
spite its founders' assertions to the contrary, has tended, like capital-
ism, to degenerate into an ideology, notably, of course, in Communist
hands. In fact, the Stalinist bureaucracy has brought Russia under the
sway of the most leaden and impenetrable of ideologies; its propagan-
dists continue to make utopian claims which conceal from the faithful
the actual abandonment of those utopian advances, as in the treatment
of women, which the "Old Bolsheviks" had fought for. As hypocrisy
is the tribute vice pays to virtue, so ideology pays tribute to utopian
thought. But as hypocrisy revealed discredits the very possibility of
virtue, so people who are disillusioned find it hard not to reject the
utopian aspirations as well as the ideological pretense.
While these disillusionments are general, the fear of being intellec-
tually out of step, of belonging to a political party with no chance of
immediate power, seems to be considerably greater here than in Europe;
this was true even in the nineteenth century, as De Tocqueville and
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Bryce observed. In the absence of a tradition of respect for independ-
ent thinking, many Americans have found only one workable defense
against the pressure of their ideological environment, namely apathy,
often touched with humor, or a self-protecting cynicism. This attitude
resembles the way in which many adolescents cope with the ideological
authority of their parents: they brush it off as the mouthings of the
"old man" or the "old lady", and largely disregard it in practice, with-
out ever taking the genuine risks of commitment to an untried and in-
dependent ethics. This is the way soldiers dealt with the ideological
output of the Information and Education branch of the Army; and it is
the way in which many civilians cope with the public-relations staffs
of business, government and labor.
However, these amiable defensive aspects are not the whole story:
apathy and cynicism-and a kind of self-deprecating humor which is
often attractive-also serve the function of gaining status through
toughness or slickness, or through the smoother type of indifference to
enthusiasm of the well-bred. These attitudes are so strong in America
that decent, constructive people, too, come to fear being taken for suck-
ers, or enthusiasts; from childhood on, boys especially have been made
ashamed of their own impulses towards warmth, commitment, gener-
osity. Among intellectual groups, one fears to be accused of the "bour-
geois" virtues; or more fashionably today, fears lest some humane re-
action escape one which might be translated in the Freudian dictionary,
where, e. g., "justice" may be read simply as "envy". It is a charac-
teristic of utopian thinking, however, that it springs from humane en-
thusiasm; those whose greatest fear is to be gullible, serious, or "soft"
are immune. But, as we know, those who fear most to be taken in,
while they will escape utopia, are in fact among the easiest prey for
ideology. Astrologers, anti-Semites, editors of the Daily News, and
other confidence men make their living from the very cynics who will
fall for the craziest story or ideology, if only it appears sophisticated,
brutal, illegal or mysterious.
These seem to me to be among the many factors which have con-
tributed to destroying the market for utopian thinking in America.
The increasing division of labor characteristic of an industrial society
has meantime played a part in inhibiting the production of such think-
ing which by its very nature requires a broad approach to the problems
of the society as a whole. Specialists shrink from this task; being "in
the- know" as to a particular set of details, they are suspicious of the
injudicious who make large plans without such knowledge. Indeed, a
whole theoretical analysis, typified by Von Hayek, holds that large-
scale planning is a human impossibility without a compulsory limiting
of choices, on the ground that no planner can know enough to do the
job if choice remains free. Where scholars and men of superior intellec-
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tual training fear to tread, cranks and charlatans-e.g., Howard Scott
of "Technocracy"--fill what market there is for big, bold, bad plans.'
More sedate is the work of men like Ralph Borsodi, and the Southern
Agrarians; while seemingly just the opposite of the Technocrats, these
nostalgic writers are quite as insouciant in prescribing for the power-
relations of modem industrial society.
These writers, moreover, can hardly be called utopian, in the sense
in which I use the word. For utopia is time-located in the future: it is
a social order which has not yet been tried, though it is a realistic pos-
sibility, not a mere idle dream. But the agrarians and anti-industrial-
ists generally seek to restore something-their picture of the earlier age
is usually distorted by convenient historical amnesias-without too
much serious attention to limiting technological factors. Thus their
writings have often an uneasy similarity to dream-work on a more pop-
ular level, like the cults of California.
If we turn to the universities, we shall not completely escape such
literary restoration movements. However, American social science has
in general sought escape from ideological pressures-where this is not
guaranteed by specialization-by means of ethical relativism, a value-
free attitude which might be thought of as the academic counterpart
of popular cynicism. (Curiously enough, Sumner represents both tend-
encies: the hardening of capitalist ideology and the beginning of a rel-
ativism which would have revolutionary implications vis--&-vis capital-
ist as well as other mores and ethnocentric prejudices.) In recent years,
under the influence of thinkers such as Dewey and the Lymds, this sort
of relativism has been under attack, and properly so. However, the in-
sistence on an immediate plan-for-action and a somewhat Puritan dis-
trust of "idle" curiosity and "irresponsibly" speculative scholars have
tended to bring utopian as well as relativist-descriptive thinking under
condemnation."1 Both academic movements-value free and action
oriented schools-are reinforced by a stereotyped notion as to what con-
stitutes research. Research is organized either about the methodologi-
cal framework of the existing disciplines or about "problems". But the
10. Of course, such writers often make slashing, though hardly original, criticisms of
contemporary society, but what they would substitute for it is left vague. For instance,
a recent issue of Teclnwcracy Briefs has the running-head: "Technocracy Engineers
Have Designed a Blue Print for A 'New America' ", which appears in the repeated
injunction to "Think North American " and in such statements as: "Not 'Dictatorship
of the Proletariat,' but Dictums of Technology; Not 'Equality of Birth,' but Equality
of Opportunity; Not 'Geopolitics,' but Geotechnics; Not 'Sovereign States' but Me-
chanics of Area Operations'
11. In view of the reactionary onslaughts against Dewey today, I wish to make
plain that I speak here only of a tendency in his thought (something of the same sort
can be said of Lynd's KNOWLEDGE FOR WHAT?), which is not actually central to it. In fact,
Dewey is not nearly so narrowly "pragmatic" as his enemies often assume; on the whole,
he is certainly a "utopian thinker."
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problems are those things which we know bother us, such as poor ad-
ministration, too much employment or too little, race and international
tensions, etc. Researchers do not go looking for other problems which
we ought to have, and indeed do have; in any case, the problems we are
aware of are so urgent that they are felt to provide not only a necessary,
but also a sufficient agenda.
By and large, the people whose function it is to think, under the
division of labor, are over-impressed by what they think about. That
is, they are over-receptive to their data, which they take at face value;
even where they are not ethical relativists, they are terribly concerned
with "what is". On the other hand a few intrepid heirs of an older
tradition try to impress themselves on their data, without too much
respect for "what is", e.g., Spengler, Sorokin. These latter, therefore,
come closer to the cranks and poets already mentioned for whom "what
is" is to be found inside their heads; the evident sadism of such thinkers
towards the facts, the enormous empirical material they deal with, may
perhaps be related to the reactionary content of their approaches to
questions of social reorganization. Few scholars achieve the kind of
sensitive and friendly relation to reality which is necessary for utopian
creation-a relation in which one respects "what is" but includes in it
also "what might be" and "what .ought to be".
One small group in our society, the architectural fraternity, has con-
tinued to produce and to stimulate thinking in the utopian tradition-
thinking which at its best combines respect for material fact with abil-
ity, even enthusiasm, for transcending the given. (Perhaps the archi-
tects are in a good position to do this since they have had so little
building to do!) Veblen was mistaken in hoping for great things from
'the engineers; the unideological matter-of-factness which he thought
their work-a-day tasks would encourage usually succumbs to a pedes-
trian acceptance of the prevailing ideologies-a more uncritical accept-
ance, often enough, than that of their businessmen or governmental
bosses. Architects, however, are engineers with a difference: their pro-
fession would have no future if there were no difference. Architects,
that is, are paid to dream-paid even to waste, Veblen would say-
but they must not ignore engineering requirements if they wish their
structures to stand. Of course, most architects do not dream; they are
simply businessmen, and their "waste" is of a most prudent kind,
since their customers buy just the right amount of it to qualify for
the social status they want. There remains a minority: e.g., Wright
and Le Corbusier; Behrendt and the Bauhaus group; the young editors
of Task Magazine; also there are community planners, such as Lewis
Mumford, Charles Ascher and Catherine Bauer, who have worked with
architects and have learned to relate their social thinking to this form
of technological experience. This minority, despite the fundamentally
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reactionary character of WVright's and Le Corbusier's types of plan-
ning,12 has helped to keep alive the utopian tradition both in the draw-
ing of plans and in the experimental demonstration of new possibilities
for living.
However, the architectural utopians have generally remained isolated
from other forms of technological experience and analytical tools (clas-
sical economics and social psychology, for example); they have in-
dulged, like most isolated men, in fanaticism and wars of sectarian anni-
hilation, as in Wright's assault on Le Corbusier; we might even suggest
that such eccentricities and blindnesses were necessary to preserve their
"nerve of failure", their courage to be different and to stand alone. 3
The book Communitas is one attempt to break down this intellectual
isolation. One author, Percival Goodman, is an architect and city plan-
ner; the other, Paul Goodman, a novelist and social critic. They have
studied, not only the physical plans of some predecessor architects, but
the intellectual constructions of some predecessor utopians. Their ef-
fort is ambitious to see what man is and may become, what societyis
and may become.
II
As utopians, the authors' ethical and moral platform rests on a scien-
tific psychology only hints of which are given in the text. It is a psy-
chology which sees man as fundamentally good, capable under proper so-
cial and physical arrangements of enjoying work, family life, nature,
privacy and cooperation-and alternating, temperamentally varied,
rhythms between them. They see their fellow-Americans as, by and
large, an unhappy folk, trapped in their competitive production and
competitive consumption, strenuously passive, sourly emulative. They
believe them, even now, to be capable of more spontaneous pleasures
and more democratic cooperation. Thus, they have not fallen into the
12. For Wright see, e.g., THE DISAPEARMNG Crry (1932); NVnFm; Dn.xoaDnA
Bunms (1945) ; and the remarkable interchanges between Vright and a group of Eng-
lish architects in AN ORGANIC ARcnTEcruRE (1939). For Le Corbusier see, c.g., WVnun
THE CATHEDRALS VE= Warrm (1947).
13. Since writing the foregoing, I have read the brilliant review by Meyer Schapiro
of ARCHnTcruRE AND MoDmN LIuE by Baker Brownell and Frank Lloyd Vright. Ar-
chlfec's Utopia, 4 PARTiSAN REvmrw 42-7 (March, 1938). Mr. Schapiro argues that the
utopias of such contemporary architects as Wright serve no constructive function but
rather operate as reactionary middle-class ideologies, glossing over class refations by
the use of words like "organic!, "construction!', "framework", which mix metaphors
taken from architecture and from social thought. He sees the architects, especially of
the depression period, as just another underemployed profession with delusions of its cen-
tral role; these men, contemplating architecture as the mirror of society, fail to grasp
those social realities which cannot be read directly from the physical forms. I am per-
suaded by Mr. Schapiro that there is less difference between architects of this stripe
and engineers than I had supposed.
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contemporary mood of a gloomy, Niebuhrian view of man, but have
remained attached to more optimistic Enlightenment traditions, as rep-
resented in such various men as Godwin, Owen, Kropotkin and Dewey;
like these thinkers, they see "what external conditions have grown
inordinately large and are obstructing the harmony of society and the
internal freedom of the people"; like them, they look for counterforces,
for unmanipulative leverage, especially education. To hold this view
today takes, I think, a certain amount of courage, more so, paradoxi-
cally, than to confess defeat at the outset. For the person who has the
"nerve of failure" takes the risks of failure but also the risks of an im-
probable success; he dares to look at life in all its contingency. It is
easier, and also more fashionable, to play the Cassandra role, and thus
to reap from each new atrocity and impasse in world affairs new moral
assurance and confirmation for one's position-like Prince Bagration
in Tolstoy's War and Peace who gave the appearance of calm mastery
by looking wise at each bit of catastrophic news from the battle as
if he had not only foreseen but planned it just that way.
In one way or another, the Goodmans feel, most contemporary city
planners avoid any responsibility for the ultimate values which their
plans-will freeze, destroy or serve. Believing that planning only makes
sense on the assumption of peace, with its economic surplus and polit-
cal choices, they are critical of those planners who are concerned simply
with finding methods to minimize atomic destruction though this might
become the easiest kind of planning to sell. 14 They are also critical of
those more modest plans which aim at no positive good, but merely at
the minimizing of lesser evils than atomic war: for instance, the relief
of traffic congestion, or of unemployment (community development
subordinated to make-work and pump-priming). For they feel that the
planner, by virtue of his position and skill, has a responsibility to see,
not only what people think they.want, or have been persuaded to want,
but what they might want, if they knew of its possibility. Unlike many
utopian radicals, however, they sympathize with those planners who
limit themselves to what can be realized at any given time, provided
that the choice of evils, or of small gains, is informed by larger aims,
and a full realization of the social consequences of amelioration.
It is also clear that the Goodmans do not think of utopian planning
as a kind of exercise in legislation, in which the planners fit people to
their theory; rather, it is an exploration of alternative possibilities. It
14. Lewis Mumford writes of an earlier city planner,- who faced somewhat similar
problems: "Leonardo da Vinci . . . dealt in his notebooks with the city proper, sug-
gested the separation of pedestrian ways from heavy traffic arteries, and went so far
as to urge upon the Duke of Milan the standardized mass production of workers' houses.
But despite these pregnant suggestions, his contributions to the art of city building re-
main poor and meager compared with his extraordinary zeal in improving the art of
fortification and assault." THE CuaLruxx OF CITIES 86 (1938).
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is, therefore, a piecemeal approach: there is no one plan, no philoso-
pher's stone. Technologies of scarcity, such as the Orient, pose entirely
different alternatives than technologies of surplus, such as the U.S.A.
Each geographic region, each cultural constellation, each stage of in-
dustrial development, presents material for exploiting quite different
optima. This sounds like relativism or eclecticism, but it is not; among
the utopias they sketch, the authors have reasoned preferences which
are grounded in a systematic ethics; the same ethics leads them to dis-
miss as immoral still other alternatives--such as an improved Garrison
State-which are conceivable, even probable.
The Goodman brothers evaluate those great city and community
plans of the recent past which, on the basis of the attitudes just indi-
cated, they feel to be of continuing importance. They ask of each plan:
what does this tell us about the architect's underlying assumptions as
to the ends of life? How, for instance, does he feel about modem indus-
trial work-is it something to be belted off from the wives and children?
In the design of the suburb, what are his implicit attitudes toward cul-
tural variety-is he freezing in his plan the one-class, one-race, one-
outlook ghettos which, as Catherine Bauer has observed, 115 are increas-
ingly fostered by government and philanthropic planners and builders
today? In the location and design of the factory, is his only value the
goal of more commodities-and even within the limits of this goal, has
he been taken in by current conventions, technologically outdated, as
to the efficiency of mass production and the limits of machine-analy-
sis of parts and subcontracted assemblies? In the design of the home,
and landscaping, how does he feel towards children-is it, for instance,
more important for them to have a workshop and climbable trees than,
since choices must be made, for their parents to have standard plumb-
ing and a white picket fence? In this fashion, by looking at the plans
-the book is full of drawings and sketches-the Goodmans read off
from them the implicit social values of the planners and those for whom
they worked: in their hands the recent history of architecture becomes
a record of evaluations and ideas. It is also a dialectical process in
which the avoidance of some evils has brought others, usually unan-
ticipated, and in which the commitment of social resources in physical
form has its own logic, opening some possibilities and foreclosing others.
We may compare the Goodmans' method to that of a psychoanalyst
who examines the unconscious choices and values which have crystal-
lized in the posture, the gestures and the character structure of a given
individual. His task is to help the individual bring these values into
conscious awareness and then to see what other structures can be built
from the materials already given. This type of study owes much, in
my opinion, to Mumford's writings; he has seen the interconnectedness
15. Bauer, Good Neighborhoods, 242 AxxALs 104 (1945).
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of city shape, city movement, and city values;1 the Goodmans, how-
ever, do not deal either with his analyses or with his own plans, as for
Honolulu or post-war England.
The Goodmans feel that the central problems for the modem planner
are posed by the Industrial Revolution. Is the planner revolting against
its coal and iron slums, like the creators of Garden Cities and Green-
belts (e.g., Ebenezer Howard, 7 Unwin, Stein)? Is he concerned with
its economic insecurity, its Frankenstein qualities, like Frank Lloyd
Wright? Or is he, on the contrary, fascinated with capitalist technol-
ogy, anxious to speed the Industrial Revolution and plunge us all at
once into a World's Fair kind of city, like Le Corbusier? Does he think
primarily of consumption values, like Buckminster Fuller, or of pro-
duction values, like the planners of the Soviet state farms, or is he con-
cemed with restoring the relation between consumption and produc-
tion which preceded the Revolution, like Borsodi? Or does he have his
eye primarily on the possibilities of economic surplus given by the Rev-
olution, and on the alternatives in production and consumption offered
by these in turn, like the planners of the T.V.A.? To illustrate the
Goodmans' analyses, we will select their treatment of Buckminster
Fuller and of the T.V.A.
Most readers will remember Fuller's Dymaxion House as a prefab-
ricated mushroom-a mobile hexagonal house on a mast, one of the
absurd technocratic dreams of the depression days. Fuller (who was
trained not as an architect but as an engineer) called it a machine for
realizing the "Eternal Now", without commitment to site, cities, or
tradition. Fuller also roams all fields, untroubled by the division of
labor. His "economics" rests on "automatic minimum existence credits
selectively contractable . . . based on foot-pounds per hour of physical
effort, with time study credits for labor-saving contributions of indi-
vidual activity . . . plus sex-segregated maintenance of anti-social lag-
gards", combined with a system of mass speculation in 10c industrial
shares. His "politics" is abbreviated by securing, through patents and
city services (though what role these would play in the self-contained
Dyrnaxion House is not clear), 'world control for the Universal Archi-
tects, a self-effacing elite "after the manner of the Ford planning
department." His "religion" is a new phase of Christianity where,
16. See especially THE CULTURE OF CITIES (1938) and CITY DEVELOPMENT (1945).
I am indebted to Mr. Mumford for a number of helpful references and suggestions.
17. The Goodmans view the work of Howard too narrowly. Like them, he made
plans not to divorce, but to reunite, work and residence. Far from espousing bigger and
better suburbias, he insisted on the integration of industry, agriculture and dormitory
along regional lines which took account of local resources and cultural patterns. Sig-
nificantly, he was inspired by Bellamy. See GIEDION, SPAca, TiME AND AcniTmmcrun
509 (1941).
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through mass-production and divorce from material concerns, espe-
cially landed property, men will again become (rather curiously iso-
lated) brothers. His "psychology", starting from the child's fear of
noise and falling, analogizes the structure of the House to the structure
of the human body (however, in the XVorld War II version of the House,
the functions of "fueling" and "refusing", i.e. elimination, are put on
one side rather than in the central shaft).
One might dismiss all this as a mad pot-pourri, including Fourierist,
money-crank, and possibly fascist bits. The Goodmans, however, take
Fuller seriously, both for what he says and what he symbolizes. They
note the importance of the Dymaxion House's freedom from ground
rent and public utilities (this is an aim; its machine for using sun-power
has not yet been invented; perhaps a little atomic pile %ill do instead).
And they see in the utter convenience of the House, its drive for com-
plete consumer's effortlessness-no furnace to fix, no garden to putter
in, no screens to hang-a symbol of the current craze for photoelectric
doors, button-lowered car windows, and other magic-carpet fantasies.
This is a very puzzling phenomenon, since the effort which is saved, for
instance of cranking a car window, is not actually unpleasant; on the
surface it appears to be a pathological laziness, but the people who go
in for it probably play golf or go bowling. The Goodmans do not try
to give a complete explanation, but they observe that the consumer,
by the proliferation of these magic, fool-proof devices, becomes pro-
gressively enslaved and helpless in the hands of the "Universal Archi-
tects" who, in Fuller's scheme, monopolize all creative and decisive
steps in the productive process.
In some respects, the T.V.A. may be thought of as a complete con-
trast to Fuller's work, though the Goodmans call attention to the
Dymaxion-like section-trailers developed by the Authority for its mo-
bile construction workers. For the T.V.A. does not divorce production
from consumption; in its efforts at grass-roots democracy, as in its use
of electric power, the two are brought into novel and multiple relations.
The T.V.A.'s success rests on the adaptation of its plan to the logic of
the man-nature pattern in the Valley: to keep the dams from silting up,
it is necessary to prevent erosion, the land must be fertilized, and some
restored to grass; to get these grass-roots, it is necessary to teach good
land-use practice and to make possible a more intensive cultivation of
the plowland; this requires encouragement of the cooperative move-
ment, the sale of cheap fertilizer, and the easing of the farmer's tasks
by cheap power and cheap appliances; and so on. People are freed from
their primary, archaic relationship to the land; but are then enabled to
relate themselves to the land and their neighbors on it in a more abun-
dant, though more complicated, way. The authors, in their brief treat-
ment, do no more than hint at the full meaning of the T.V.A. exper-
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ience; they say little that is concrete; they move altogether too quickly
from T.V.A.'s achievements to the issues it has not so far touched: "the
problems of surplus and leisure, of the relation of culture and work, the
role of great cities." For the solution of these, they turn to their own
model plans.
III
The authors present three such models. Each chooses to solve one
problem to the exclusion of the others. The first model aims to increase
leisure and the consumable surplus; the second, to reintegrate culture
and work; the third, to reduce to a minimum both economic regulation
and economic insecurity while maintaining large urban concentrations.
The authors believe that the great plans of their predecessors expressed
mixed aims; and they realize that any conceivable plan would likewise
blend patterns from each of their three separated goals. In their logical
abstractness, the plans are "ideal types" in Max Weber's sense; but
they are also ideal types in the vernacular sense of something to be
striven for, something utopian. Thus, the models, or, as the authors
call them, paradigms, may be thought of as tools for analysing any ex-
isting plan; but in their statement, they are also efforts at analysing the
conflict of aims in contemporary America..
The latter purpose comes out most clearly in the first plan, which
rather sardonically assumes that there is to be no change in dominant
American cultural values and socio-economic organization and raises
the question how can such values be unequivocally represented in the
plan? Here the authors present a paradox in Veblen's thought: Veblen
wanted to remove the archaic and pecuniary fetters on production by
applying the matter-of-fact logic of the engineer; however, having step-
ped up production, he also wanted to step down consumption by get-
ting rid of leisured waste and emulative luxury; would not the result be
still greater mass insecurity through "overproduction"? 18 The Good-
mans feel that this paradox is not solved by Keynesian methods, both
because, short of building pyramids, there are not sufficient objects of
public spending to sop up the excess production, and because such pub-
lic works do not give sufficient incentive, including psychological incen-
tive, to profit. Their "solution" in this case is therefore an advertis-
ing man's dream: city planning for efficient consumption of luxury goods.
This requires the following physical arrangements: (1) Metropolises,
large enough to permit mass production of luxuries, and to encourage
the sway of emulation and thereby the insatiability of desire. There
will be crowding to lower distributive costs, so that even more resources
may be devoted to production, shopping and consumption. (2) The
18. The authors realize that Veblen did not live to see the present potentialities for
abundance in America.
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center of the city becomes a huge shell of a department store; the shell
also provides room for offices, entertainment and other light industry,
and hotels; the corridors of the department store are the streets, so that
no one may walk without being tempted to buy; and of course people
are forced to walk-they need not and cannot drive their cars in these
corridors. By thus merging streets and corridors (Bellamy suggested
enclosable streets in Looking Backward), and building a cylindrical 21-
story skyscraper one mile in diameter, the authors calculate that they
could include all the non-residential facilities for the population of Man-
hattan-and New York of course comes closest as it is to their model.
A tremendous gain in servicing and construction efficiency would ensue.
But the most important gain would be in the opportunities for display
and advertising-a world's fair every-day and everywhere. (3) In their
irony, the planners naturally fear lest the poetry of the great writers
compete with the poetry of advertising. Hence the universities, mu-
seums and other great institutions of non-popular culture are zoned-
like any nuisance--outside the central cylinder; however, by visits
there, people weary of the fashion-show at the City Center, weariness
which would be economically disastrous, may renew themselves for
further bursts of consumption. (4) A somewhat similar renewing func-
tion is served by planning a zone of open country, a real "escape",
quite near, perhaps five miles from the concentrated Center, beyond
which would lie a further zone of state parks and adult camps. (5) Since
the authors believe that the true alternate to the city is country, not
suburbs, the residence zone is not a satellite town of free-standing
homes, but an encircling ring of apartment houses. The apartments,
however, are merely service shells, permitting the individual occupants
to partition and decorate their space to taste-and emulation.
At the time of spring inventory, by a revival of carnival practices,
there would be a season of immense idleness, with bonfires of outmoded
furniture, a crescendo of waste-in preparation for the next organized
spurt of highly efficient consumption.
The reader of this abstract, as of the text, may not always be sure
here what is sexy but serious satire (as in Huxley's Brave Ne-, World),
what plain silliness, and at what point the authors are stating their
own genuine goals. In general, however, the moral of the plan comes
through without ambiguity: it is a criticism of popular culture, with
its drive for less work, more pay and more play; it is also an effort to
reveal certain hidden elements of moral worth in modem capitalism.
The criticism-the air-conditioned nightmare theme-is familiar enough
among radical writers, who sometimes tend to attack with equal fervor
the worst abuses, such as lynching, and the most venial foibles, such
as radio commercials. But the implicit ethical defense of capitalism on
the ground of its provision of bounteous consumption is seldom found
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outside Chamber of Commerce circles. Sophisticated people who de-
fend capitalism do so either on lesser-evil grounds, or as an interim sys-
tem, or as a support for political and intellectual freedom; they tend
to be apologetic about its encouragement of consumer self-indulgence,
if not about consumer values generally.
This general attitude springs, it seems to me, from a growing intel-
lectual hostility to the values of consumer free choice. 9 It is not simply
a question of poverty, for many people do not even enjoy window shop-
ping. The left-wingers feel the choice is immoral, because unequally
distributed; many, Puritan at heart, would prefer to distribute scarcity.
Social hygieriists feel it is bad for people: they eat too much rich food
(a feeling often rationalized by reference to starving people elsewhere
in the world), go to too many movies, etc. Snobs, especially in the
older Seaboard cities, react against popular emulative consumption-
and the growing cult of effortlessness referred to above-by cultivat-
ing an indifference to material things; driving Fords, for instance, until
they, too, became designed for comfort, rather than more plushy "petit
bourgeois" cars such as Oldsmobiles. Those influenced by Veblen or
theorists of functionalism in design are hostile to "waste", to conspic-
uous consumption, and to competition in sale and display. And many
people seek to assert their individuality, not by enjoying choice among
available consumption products, but by making an issue of resistance
to all salesmanship and advertising. Indeed, it has become fashionable
even for advertising men to attack advertising.
These attacks are indiscriminate: the joys of consumption, of free
consumer choice, of "waste" and frivolity and excess, are thrown out
along with the obvious evils of inequality and of anxious emulation.
Yet while we'are waiting for a better social order, or more meaningful
job-opportunities, it would be a mistake to overlook this freedom and
the available chances for making it still more free.
This, if I understand them, is one of the points the Goodmans have
in mind in their "City of Efficient Consumption". The efficiency they
have in mind is of two sorts. On the side of production, they follow
Veblen in seeking to eliminate waste, for instance excessive distribu-
tion costs; in order to increase, while lowering hours, the total annual
consumable product of goods and services. But on the side of consump-
tion, the "efficiency" is of a different order: it is an effort to heighten
waste and emulation in order to make sure that everything produced
is consumed, lest the economy be choked by its own superlative produc-
tiveness; the pump to be psychologically primed is that of the individ-
ual spender. Perhaps, too, the Goodmans seriously feel that by enhanc-
19. For discussion of the percolation of consumer attitudes into all spheres of life,
and the overreaction against those attitudes, see Riesman, The Cash Customer, 11 Cox-
mON SENsE 183 (1942).
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ing the efficiency of consumption of the population as a whole, it might
be possible to avoid the economic, maybe even political need for peri-
odic creation of an enlarged class of professionally-efficient consumers,
namely the armed services. If by consuming luxuries, we could avoid
"consuming" armaments, most of us would settle for their City, any
day. But it is rather a caricature than the best of their possible worlds.
In their second model or paradigm, the Goodmans present their own
values explicitly. There they try to deal with the divorce of production
from consumption in modem industrial society, and to recreate forms
of work which will be meaningful without a futile attempt at full re-
treat to handicraft production. But unlike most of the writers from
Marx on who discuss this problem, often in terms of modem man's
"alienation", they are fully aware that the impersonality of work to-
day has certain advantages, even if these advantages are analogous to
the "secondary gains" of a neurotic illness. They see, for example, that
punctuality on the job, which seems to enslave man to the clock,
"makes the work itself much more tolerable; for it establishes it in an
impersonal, secondary environment where-once one has gotten out of
bed early in the morning-the self has already resigned all claims." At
work, one is "relieved" of one's family; by the same token, after hours,
one is "free" of work. Nevertheless, it is, humanly speaking, a crazy
divorce, which is simply made smoother by those planners of suburbs
who shield the residential area from any contact with the productive
economy. The Goodmans try to see what utopian reunions are possible.
To reunite workshop and home, they advocate restoring some work
to the home, as domestic industry or subsistence farming, while taking
out of the home, and into the larger economy, some domestic services.
As to the former, they point to the decentralization made possible by
electricity and the new types of small machine tools; as to the latter,
they rearrange the home itself, and the role of children.
What the Goodmans are suggesting here is a program which, by in-
creasing the self-sufficiency of the home, the city, and the region, will
both lend variety and meaning to work and provide the economic basis
for freedom. In this, they follow Frank Lloyd Wright on the physical
side and Kropotkin on the social and political; they insist that each pro-
ducer must have a say in the distribution of "his" product. They be-
lieve that the solution of the problem of political power in an industrial
economy lies in planning for farm-factory units on a regional basis,
where each unit will have enough self-sufficiency to defend itself in bar-
gaining against other like units. This involves "the close integration of
factory and farm workers-the factory hands taking over in the fields
at peak seasons; farmers doing factory work in winter; town people,
especially children, living in the country; farmers making small parts
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for the factories." But the self-sufficiency must not go too far; each
farm, each unit, each region will be integrated in the national and inter-
national market as to some of its dealings; there is to be none of the
"wilful provincialism that is so nauseating in movements of regional
ifterature and art." Education on and off the job, and frequent changes
of job, are to give the producers the knowledge to support their control
of distribution, and the world-minded outlook which will guide trading
of their regional surpluses for surpluses from elsewhere.
The Goodmans say nothing as to how such a redistribution of re-
sources is to be set up, nor how it will differ in operation from certain
patterns of bargaining we have at present, when, let us say, Montana
trades its copper for Pennsylvania's coal. In their effort to create a
kind of internal balance of economic power, they are up against the
same sort of problem which is faced in the Acheson-Lilienthal report
on atomic energy: namely, how find the leverage to distribute economic
(or war) potential in such a fashion as to prevent either raids or au-
tarchy. Those who now have the potential (in the atomic case, the
United States) hesitate to surrender it, even for the hope of peace; those
who lack it (in the atomic case, the U.S.S.R.) hesitate to surrender the
chance of getting it, even for the fear of war.
The authors are more instructive in their psychological analysis of
the problem of bringing productive work back into human scale. They
see the problem as even more difficult, since they see man as even more
complex, than many of the industrial psychologists who have been in-
fluenced by Elton Mayo. To illustrate: they do not insist, as the Mayo
group does, that most workmen want always to work in teams, but
rather that men want both group and individual work, both city and
country work, both supervision and apprenticeship. Now, since it is
undeniable that many factory workers today do not seem to want such
diversity, but prefer their accustomed routines and their cluster of as-
sociates, we would have to say that this is not what they might want
under a different social structure and a different educational system.
While many industrial psychologists attempt to adjust workers as they
find them to their malaise, as by seeing that they have "recognition"
from management and agreeable team-mates, the Goodmans, being
utopian, are more interested in adjusting the factory-system to their
vision of what man is "really" like. For instance, adolescents would
spend five months in general education, two in study-travel, and four
in productive work, divided between farm and factory; older workers
would shift around less, but would still work on a rhythmic basis with
some time devoted either to supervision or to work at their highest
technical skill. The jobs themselves would be reanalyzed, not with an
eye to technical efficiency, either for production or consumption, but
with an eye primarily to joy in work and the assurance of freedom:
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"Any end is prima facie suspicious if its means, too, do not give satis-
faction."
"Supposing one of the masters, away on his two months of indi-
vidual work, drafting designs for furniture, should decide-having
studied the furniture of the Japanese-to dispense -ith chairs!
"It is problems like this that would create a bitter struggle in
the national economy."
It is important to observe, in this otherwise idyllic passage, that the
Goodmans do anticipate "bitter struggle" even in Utopia. This is an
advance on the work of Bellamy as well as earlier utopians (including
Marx) who, focussed on the sordid struggles which spring from capital-
ist relations, were not sufficiently attentive to clashes of temperament
and interest which would spur the writing of new utopias even when
theirs had been achieved.
The Goodmans illustrate their plan-which they term "The New
Commune: the Elimination of the Difference between Production and
Consumption"-with drawings of the farmhouses in which families
with children will be living. The farms are to be diversified, and zoned
quite near to the smallish (200,000) urban nuclei. All children will do
farm chores and thus enter "the economy" at a point where it is most
comprehensible; the family-sized farms, aided by cooperative market-
ing and mechanization, will develop a cultural tone which can compete
with, rather than submit to, the metropolitan culture.
The metropolitan milieu itself is to recapture something of the qual-
ity of leisureliness and sociability of the medieval city square. In their
illustrative plan for "Printers' Square", for example, there would be
a place for causerie among the gathering workmen, more typical of the
French cafe than of the American tavern or coke-bar. Fronting on the
Square is the printing factory, with its attached technical school of
printing and engraving; a library with terrace-tables for drinks and
snacks; some shops; an apartment for urban (childless) dwellers, whose
meals are home-cooked after the dirty-work of vegetable washing and
peeling, etc., has been communally done. The concept of the Square
is, however, rather artificial. Printing happens to be a noisy industry,
though not perhaps inevitably so; its relation to the rest of the activi-
ties that front on the Square seems tenuous: mere ecological proximity
will not produce the kind of local color and culture which the Good-
mans seek. Any utopian planning faces the problem of visualizing the
intangibles that would give social meaning to physical form and lay-
out. The problem is symbolized by the authors' puzzle as to what kind
of public monument they should locate in the Square. A church?
Hardly, though Frank Lloyd Vright, despite the idiosyncratic charac-
ter of his own religion, plunks one down in his plan for Broadacre City.
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The Goodmans half ironically suggest a Sir Patrick Geddes Regional
Museum as the focal point of their Square.
Bellamy's Looking Backward, published 60 years earlier, gives us, I
think, a more imaginative glimpse of the social and domestic life of a
utopian city which in spaciousness and cultivation resembles the more
fragmentary picture of the "New Commune"; however, Bellamy's han-
dling of the problems of work and economic life generally is about as
different as can be from the Goodmans'. Unlike so many of his con-
temporary utopians, Bellamy did not turn his back on the Industrial
Revolution; he welcomed the increasing pace of mass production and
trustification; under his plan, industry was to be "efficiently" run on
a national scale, under the direction of the generals of the Industrial
Army. All youth were to serve a three-year term at common labor in
the Army (rather like a compulsory C.C.C.); those who lacked the
ability or desire to specialize would stay on in its lower ranks. The
political leaders were to be chosen from among the top administrators
who had risen in the Army; in fact, politics was to be largely the process
of industrial administration. In some senses, then, Bellamy was a pre-
cursor of the theorists of the "managerial revolution."
Since consumption goods and services were to -be equally distrib-
uted, without regard to rank in the Army (invalids, too, would receive
an equal share), Bellamy was particularly concerned to meet the charge
of capitalist critics that there would be no "incentive" either to work
or to rise-this old, but ever renewed charge based on man's alleged
innate laziness. He met this argument partly as the Goodmans do, by
an effort to make work meaningful and pleasureful in itself and by en-
couraging feelings of benevolence and human fellowship in work, but
also by reluctant though heavy reliance on the love of praise and the
fear of censure. Men were to be educated to seek glory through their
industrial ardor, and to avoid being held in contempt for duckingtheir
social responsibilities; officers would rise on the basis of the zealous
performance of their underlings.
It seems plain today that production can all too easily be organized
on such an emulative and centralized system (compare the "socialist
competition" of the Russians); in fact, the motives of hunger and gain
which are supposed to- operate our market economy have been very
largely dispensed with even there.20 Bellamy, it seems, was not quite
utopian enough. One reason is that, though he foresaw the possibility
of abundance, if the nationalized industries were properly organized
and competitive and distributive wastes abolished, he did not foresee-
who could have?-the possibilities of overabundance, the bountiful sur-
20. Karl Polanyi's THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944), raises the question whether
hunger and gain were actual motives as well as approved ones to any large extent, even
in the heyday of the market.
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plusage of means of production. Equality, and a comfortable, unos-
tentatious standard of living had therefore to be his principal goal,
not joy and freedom in work.
Moreover, as we have just observed, the earlier socialists and uto-
pians, including Bellamy, believed that politics would disappear, once
the community owned the means of production; and that universal
peace would reign, once people were no longer educated to meanness
and fear by the ruthlessness of the capitalism of their day. Today, an
Industrial Army would give us nightmares; our awareness of totalitar-
ian dangers leads the Goodmans to turn to regionalist and syndicalist
witers as against the authoritarian-nationalist Bellamy for suggestions
how to limit the power of the managerial bureaucracy. But as indicated
above, their suggestions do not meet the issues.
On the side of the manner of living, however, life has not caught up
with Bellamy to the same degree; if we judge by the Goodmans' work,
he is still utopian here. The city pictured in Looking Backward has
about as much sociability and amenity as the Goodmans' "New Com-
mune."21 There is ample leisure; there are goods enough to satisfy all
genuine needs (Bellamy even foresaw the radio); domestic life is urbane,
with the lot of women improved by communal services. A citizen who
is willing to settle for a somewhat lower standard of living is permitted
after a time to avoid industrial service, and to devote himself to study,
the arts, or whatever he pleases-a suggestion which is also made in
the Goodmans' book. Above all, human relations are to be friendly and
unexploitative; women are the companions and equals of men (though
organized for work in a separate hierarchy); and the individuality of
children is respected; in fact from early years on, children are encour-
aged to develop their taste and their vocational bent. What is similar
here to the quality of the Goodmans' Commune is the emphasis on
quiet happiness, as against excitement, as the aim of life. There is to be
neither war nor economic competition; the excitement of the chase, of
sadism, of exploitation will be disapproved; the city plan calls for con-
templative, easy-going, and cultivated joys.
The Goodmans do not really hope that we could move directly to
such a utopia, when our values are so very largely the excitement-values
of the "City of Efficient Consumption." They offer, therefore, a third
plan which they term an interim measure: its purpose is to minimize
economic regulation, and thus to permit once more a choice of economic
goals.
Over-regulation in our surplus economy arises, the Goodmans argue,
because "overproduction" jeopardizes the jobs of the poor and the
21. In his sequel, EQUALrrY 290-5 (1897), Bellamy dealt more fully with decentraliza-
tion; Manhattan was to have 250,000 people.
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profits of the rich; the government is forced to interfere to assure full
employment, thus making employment itself-in all its modem mean-
inglessness-the very end and aim of the community's political activ-
ity. Then the free market, one of the few remaining freedoms, becomes
entangled in regulation (private, of course, as well as governmental)
and taxes (private, of course, as well as governmental) to raise funds
to subsidize, insure, and otherwise shore up the economy. The authors
propose: that the problem of subsistence be divided off from the prob-
lem of luxury; the subsistence market, occupying a small fraction of
the country's resources, would be government-controlled, with some
scheme akin to rationing providing everyone with his basic needs; while
the luxury market would be free of control and entitled, since no one
would starve in any case, to its privilege of boom and bust.
"The retrenchment might go very far, relaxing kinds of governmen-
tal regulation that are now indispensable; for, where the prospec-
tive wage earner has a subsistence independently earned, the con-
ditions under which he agrees to work can be allowed to depend on
his own education rather than on the government's coercion of the
employer." 22
The industrialist would then lose the subsistence market and its labor
force; the worker, unless in post-adolescence he could afford a paid sub-
stitute, would be coerced for the fraction of his time (recall again Bel-
lamy's conscription) needed to produce the subsistence goods and serv-
ices.
The authors believe that such a pattern (its economic details, ob-
viously complex, are barely sketched) would commit the community
to less irreversible change, in architecture and layout, than is demanded
by the present type of Keynesian-New Deal methods for insuring full
employment. They fully realize, however, that the basic question
"what is subsistence?" is a cultural, not a medical problem, and that
its solution requires a decision as to how much in consumers' emulative
goods (the "standard of living") we are willing to give up in order to
gain a greater measure of freedom from regulation. The Goodmans
assume that much of our expenditure on clothing, cars, etc., is really
forced on us by a competitive race, failure in which threatens even the
minimum of self-support. The subsistence economy will, accordingly,
provide food, clothing, and prefabricated shelter which is adequate but
22. By giving those who want to pursue wealth an entire economy to themselves, in-
sulated from the subsistence economy, the plan retains one of the chief advantages of
nineteenth-century capitalism, where power was divided because some men sought it
directly in the political sphere while others went primarily after money. Thus, unlike
the modern managerial state, politics and economics were not entirely overlapping spheres
the result was some freedom in the interstices and a lessening of ideological pressures,
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not varied or stylish. On the other hand, since people are to be freed
for such work in the luxury economy as they want, they must be as-
sured, as part of their subsistence, more physical and psychological
mobility than at present; hence, full transportation (and medical serv-
ice) are handled as subsistence items also.
The most difficult political and economic questions arise in attempt-
ing to relate the two economies, the free one and the subsistence one.
(It is here, as the authors point out, that similar attempts-Robert
Owen's plan for New Lanark, Louis Blanc's Workshops, the FSA and
the WPA-have failed.) To keep the subsistence economy non-com-
petitive, its standards cannot be permitted to rise; to keep the private,
.free economy from oppressing it, for instance by control of facilities
such as transport that both would use, the government might have
to use its power over the labor supply. In times of prosperity, demand
for subsistence products such as clothing and shelter will diminish, since
almost everyone will be able to afford the greater variety of offerings
on the private, free economy; in times of crisis, the subsistence demands
will rise-but this very pattern will tend to mitigate the business cycle.
By the (admittedly) very roughest of calculations based on national
income and production figures, the authors guess that no more than
one-seventh of the available resources (in labor-time or money) would
be required to produce subsistence for all Americans; and that this
figure is less than that to which the country, in pursuit of the same se-
curity goals, is already committed. Obviously, these calculations, finan-
cial and political, would need refinement before one could be pretty
sure that the plan of the Goodmans would be any less fragile than the
Keynesian approach which they attack.
Most interesting on the architectural side are the elevations and lay-
outs for the residences of the subsistence workers. The Goodmans, un-
like Mumford, have faith that prefabrication can produce really cheap
mass housing. Many of their trailer-type houses would not need public
utilities; others would operate with community kitchens and showers;
families could combine their allotments to secure more commodious
quarters. The subsistence houses are not meant to be especially in-
viting-though, as drawn, they look better than millions of rural and
urban slum dwellings-for if one wants better housing, one must work
in the free economy to pay for it: the subsistence economy's purpose
is freedom, not luxury.
Once the obligations to the subsistence economy have been met, one
would not have to work at all; whatever one needed, within the subsist-
ence limits, would be free (again compare Looking Back-ward). But do
we really want freedom?
"Suddenly, the Americans would find themselves rescued from the
physical necessity and social pressure which alone, perhaps, had
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been driving them to their habitual satisfactions; they might sud-
denly find the commercial pleasures flat and unpalatable, but they
would not therefore suddenly find any other resources within them-
selves.
"Like that little girl in the progressive school, longing for the
security of the grownup's making her decisions for her, who asks:
'Teacher, today again do we have to do what we want to do?' ",23
Escape from bored freedom into compulsive activity and excitement
might become a powerful political movement, until education had been
able to nourish the instinct of workmanship, of spontaneous creativity,
the capacity for happiness as against excitement, which the Goodmans,
along with their utopian teachers, believe to exist in everyone. Perhaps,
they suggest, there would be a revival of small business ventures (in
fact, we have actually seen this among the veterans, who today come
closest to having a subsistence claim devoid of moral strictures); "for
the risk of fundamental insecurity of life has been ,removed, and why
should one not work to amass a little capital and then risk it in an en-
terprise that was always close to one's heart?" In any case, there
would be renewed emphasis on the problem of one's "calling", one's
true vocation, when all have behind them the security and experience
of the subsistence economy and can take their time, as only the rich can
now do, before choosing one's work in the free enterprise economy.
(Again, a theme from Bellamy.) Or, one might choose not to choose.
but to travel or study, a modern Thoreau.
The Goodmans, however, share values with Thoreau (and Frank
Lloyd Wright) but also with Marx, who spoke of the "idiocy of rural
life"; they do not want to dismantle the metropolis. But trailers will
not work in a large city; even a city slum will be too dear for the sub-
sistence economy-as, indeed, the poor today cannot afford big city
housing where thereis no direct or indirect subsidy. So, then, a man
must pay for his metropolitan advantages by work in the private econ-
omy, without thereby securing exemption from his subsistence duties.
Thus many might desert the metropolis for the subsistence centers, and
the Goodmans realize that this problem is not fully solved in their
theoretical structure. But, since the purpose of their plan is security
with minimum regulation, it cannot be said to leave most big city
dwellers worse off than today. Especially if they want freedom.
IV
It has not been my purpose in these pages to criticize the Goodmans'
own models, nor their discussion of earlier community plans. The real
23. Bellamy had observed: "The fact that all the world goes after money saves a
man the necessity of anxiously debating what his life is for." From the unpublished
papers of Bellamy, quoted in ARTHUR E. MORGAN, NOWHERE WAS SoMmWmr= 178
(1946).
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value of their book lies not in this or that detail but in their explicit
attachment to the now-languishing tradition of utopian thought. Their
text, like a physical plan, does not render up all its meaning at first
glance: an innocent-looking phrase may conceal a whole philosophy;
I hope that they and others who are qualified will proceed with the
necessary follow-up. The sort of imaginative courage, the sort of detail-
work, which is required to plan today even for the development of a
single city or region, is no news to the readers of this Journal, since the
Yale Law School was one of the first institutions to recognize that com-
munity planning demands both a policy goal and a novel integration
of the sciences. 24 But it may be news to the many community planners,
at least of the older generation, who view their work as just another
specialty. This problem of interdisciplinary cooperation may be illu-
minated by a brief comparison with a bold contemporary plan which is
now being put into effect, the new Plan for the community of Wrarsaw.
What follows is based on a conversation in the spring of 1946 with
Szymon and Helene Syrkus, the former being one of the principal
architects (now a director of the National Ministry of Reconstruction)
and the latter an executive of the Plan.
Long before 1939, a small group of architects, city planners, social
scientists and social workers had begun, in isolation from the domi-
nant soddenness of the Polish government, to develop rather utopian
conceptions of community planning. To a large extent, they seem to
have been inspired by Robert hven. They had an opportunity to build
a "pilot model", a spacious though inexpensive cooperative in Ra-
casiewicz, a Warsaw suburb; then the War came. After the bombing
and capture of the city, members of the group continued to meet se-
cretly to make plans for the rebuilding of the capital after the War.
As they proceeded, they drew into their circle additional scientific col-
laborators. They discovered, for instance, that proper residential lay-
out required an analysis of how far children could comfortably walk
alone-for this they went to the child psychologists and social workers.
From the economists, they secured data as to the cost to the community
if private automobiles had to be provided for. From the data of the en-
gineers, the group concluded what factories still had to be treated as
nuisances under modem conditions, and what other factories due, for
instance, to the type of skill employed, might add to the culture and
amenity of the city; they proceeded with zoning on this basis. Archi-
24. See Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Edication and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YA.LE L. J. 203, 217-32 (1943); DnrnEwvE Co!ndrr-
TEE ON REGIONAL PLANNING, YALE UNIVERsITY, THE CASE FOa RnE.Gio:AL PLAznaIuG
(McDougal ed. 1947). On the diversity of interests and skills required of the com-
munity planner, see Martin Meyerson, What a Planner Has fo Know in Promx rz.s.
ANNUAL Co FERF.NcE ON PLANwNIN 167 (1946). I am indebted to Mr. Meyerson for
helpful suggestions.
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tects and landscape architects worked on the problem: what sort of
vistas, what sort of decor, create what sort of social and psychological
attitudes in people; they wanted the walls and roofs and other shapes
to say to people: "what's your hurry?" (The subtlety of this problem
is such that-it seems hardly to have been touched scientifically; the
Rorschach test provides certain clues to its investigation, as Schach-
tel's work has shown.) 21
On the basis of these and other studies, the cooperating architects
then began to draw the detail plans for post-war Warsaw. Most of the
group were eventually killed by the Nazis; the Syrkuses were among
the few who managed to survive the wounds they suffered in concen-
tration camps; many of the plans also survived. But after the isolation
of the War, the survivors felt the need to see what had been learned
elsewhere in their field; they journeyed to Sweden, to Russia, to the
United States to find out.
It is my impression that they discovered little (save a few technical
points such as new types of building materials) -which their interdis-
ciplinary group had not already explored. Reading Communilas fifteen
months later, it was striking to see the resemblances between the War-
saw plans and those of the Goodmans' favorite utopia, the "New Com-
mune", both with respect to some of the social values implicit in the
plans and with respect to their physical features. The Warsaw resi-
dences are to be formed in super-blocks, but without the monotonous
regularity of most of our own urban redevelopments; rather, with an
eye to vistas, the paths will wind; the walk-up apartments will be vari-
ously grouped. At the calculated radii there will be: trees and play-
yards for small fry; schools and libraries and meeting halls for the older
folk; shopping centers will be on the through highways no further away
than a mother can easily walk with a small child. Since the women are
to be freed as much as possible from domestic drudgery, laundries,
creches, cooking will be communal; there are rooms where they can
park their children at night to attend political meetings or go to the
library with their husbands. But since women also enjoy cooking, when
they are not compelled to it, and gain a feeling of status from the qual-
ity of a particular soup or casserole, the Polish planners insisted that
each apartment have a private kitchen too, even though they were try-
ing desperately to save on plumbing and all dispensable expense. In
this decision, they expressed their own values, and also, they felt, those
of the people.
Interdisciplinary cooperation and scientific surveys, however, will
not solve the problems which arise when the planners' values diverge
25. Ernest Schachtel, The Dynamic Perception and the Symbolism of Form: With
Specal Reference to the Rorschach Test, 4 PSYCHiATRY 79 (1941) ; On Memory and
Childhood Amnesia, 10 id. 1 (1947).
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from those of the general community. This point was raised by my
question: suppose a family prefers the amenity of an automobile to
the amenity of a kitchen, or would even sacrifice for it the minimum
standards as to square feet of space per person that the planners
had fixed upon; how could the family exercise consumer free choice
and make its preference felt? The Syrkuses replied that, apart from
obvious economic obstacles in present-day Poland, the example of
America had convinced them that the automobile will spoil the best
of urban residential plans; moreover, the factories and even open coun-
try will be within easy walking or bicycling distance from the homes;
there will be a rapid transit system and a highway net along the River
outside the City (I suppose, for common carrier and military traffic).
They also added that the appropriate legislative bodies had enthusiasti-
cally approved the Plan. I was not entirely satisfied with this explana-
tion.2 Abstract as the question was in 1946, I had the impression
that the planners might be freezing the shape of the City against pri-
vate cars, perhaps without fully acquainting their constituents with
the meaning of the choice being made in their behalf. Yet since health
and the general welfare are clearly involved in minimum housing stand-
ards, I asked myself if the question really differed from the forcible
vaccination of individual recalcitrants by public health authorities.
Anyhow, the car question came to symbolize for me the whole issue
of coercion in utopian community planning.
The very gap that separates the thinking of the advanced planner
from that of his clients tends to lead him to dictatorial measures. For
his work teaches him that he can do little to achieve his goals by verbal
persuasion: if the walls and streets and vistas, the cars and subways,
the kitchens and showers-if these say "hurry, hurry", how can his
message of communal quiet and calm possibly be heard, or, if heard,
emotionally understood? If people are drugged with excitement, will
they not crave more of the same, like any addict, especially when the
whole economy would flounder if they failed to respond? Must not the
planner at least jazz up his plans and elevations? I suggest that the
true utopian errs if he allows himself to be seduced by such arguments.
The moment he begins to manipulate (let alone use physical coercion)
-even if the manipulation only consists in the use of reasoning which
does not convince him but which he feels may "sell" his audience-he
leaves the realm of utopia for that of ideology. Thereby he demon-
strates, in many cases, his lack of the "nerve of failure." For it is not
26. Before the reader becomes too skeptical of the Polish dictatorship--on this
score-let him recall that rent subsidies, multiple dwelling laws, etc., compel the renter
in American cities to buy space and fixtures where he might prefer to spend his share of
the social income on something else. A group of American architects and city planners,
visiting Warsaw, recently commented on the "extremely humanistic" and undoctrinaire
ouality of the Poles' physical planning. N. Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1947, p. 6, col. 3.
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always his benevolence which leads him to force or manipulate people
to do what is in their objective interest. It is his doubt as to his own
correctness, which can be assuaged only by securing confirmation in
plans and behavior he will live to see--these are his prophet's "sign".
The Goodmans quote Daniel Burnham who lived at a time (the turn
of the century) when, or so it appears to us, faith was a less difficult
virtue:
"Make no little plans; they have no magic to stir men's blood and
probably themselves will not be realized. Make big plans: aim
high in hope and work, remembering that a noble, logical diagram,
once recorded, will never die, but long after we are gone will be a
living thing, asserting itself with ever growing insistency."
So might the Warsaw underground planners have thought, who later
perished in the concentration camps, or in the city's battles of libera-
tion. Their diagrams did survive. But this strikes us as somewhat ac-
cidental, a rather insubstantial ground for faith. The real question is
one about people, not plans: are they really hopeless addicts or can
they, enough of them, appreciate what a good community plan would
be like even when they have grown up under a bad plan? The utopian's
faith is that the answer is affirmative, though its timing-here he can
learn from Marx and Engels-depends on the congeries of social forces.
That faith is supported by the very tradition of utopian thinking in
which the planner works, and which is a record of just such human abil-
ity to transcend the ideologies provided by the culture and to add some-
thing new to the small precious stock of social ideas.
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